

SECRETCapt. Gilbert
24 August 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ICAPS.

SUBJECT: Clarification of Points in Mr. Armstrong's
Submittal

In accordance with your instruction, and in keeping with the statement of Mr. Armstrong, I spent considerable time today with Mr. Allan Evans, Director, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, to seek further clarification on parts of the four problems submitted by Mr. Armstrong to CIA under his memorandum of 2 August 1949.

I - 1. That ICAPS serve as a joint staff under the direction of, and responsible to, the DCI, be composed of members contributed by the several agencies on a fulltime basis, but not "representing" the agency, and be headed by a chief who will also be the Executive Secretary of the IAC.

Evans sees no conflict between ICAPS acting as the Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence and performing, as required, certain staff work for the IAC, of which the DCI is the Chairman. He did not visualize a permanent staff in the sense of the National Security Council organization, and he was not pressing for the choice of the title "Executive Secretary." What State does desire here is that adequate staff work be performed for the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

I - 3. That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC, and that the Standing Committee serve as a subordinate or staff committee to the IAC to consider on an interagency basis, problems referred to it by the IAC.

Evans contends that the representation on the Standing Committee should be the same as the membership on the IAC. If any one agency, for example the Joint Chiefs, does not desire representation on the Standing Committee, they may make this decision themselves without disrupting the basic concept. ICAPS' relationship to the Standing Committee should change to the extent that the members of ICAPS as a whole would no longer be members of the Standing Committee; that the Chief of ICAPS, in chairing the Standing Committee, should represent CIA; and that the other members of ICAPS should remain out of the Standing Committee meetings, except as needed for specific purposes.

Further discussion of this whole problem about the relationship of ICAPS to the Standing Committee brought certain modifications into the stability of Evans' thinking process. He could see the benefit to be achieved by the other members of ICAPS in listening to and participating

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in the discussions at the IAC meetings. However, he felt that CIA usually had too many of their members coming to meetings, and that their presence was having a bad effect upon agency representation.

I - 4. That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility on research programs primarily through the Estimates Division, whose primary function should be such coordination, in accordance with the following principles:

When I told Evans that NSC 50 allowed us to solve our problems in a manner which we determined most appropriate, he still expressed the view that the "Estimates Division" is the only way for CIA to conduct its coordinating responsibility on intelligence research programs.

I - 4a. CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, including current research intelligence projects;

The word "activities" was used in purposeful manner. They do not want CIA to be considered the center of all foreign intelligence information. On the other hand, State does feel that CIA should know what all intelligence agencies are doing, which is not making of CIA a central reservoir on all foreign intelligence information. This is the "Central index" concept of having in one spot a knowledge of all agency programs at all times. For example, quite some time ago the Atomic Energy Commission wanted to know what agency or agencies were doing research on electric power in Russia. CIA did not know, and eventually it was found out that OIR was doing such a project.

I - 4b. CIA will have free access to the plans and programs of the several intelligence agencies, subject to overall departmental regulation;

The accessibility to "plans and programs" is modified by the words "subject to overall departmental regulation." It is true that this paragraph is intended to liberalize the present viewpoint regarding inspection of "intelligence matters" mentioned in NSCID No. 1. The words "subject to overall departmental regulation" refer to the agency personnel rather than to the people from CIA. The agency is to determine what their own people may talk about and what they may not talk about. Accordingly, the words "subject to overall departmental regulation" involve policy as well as security.

I - 4f. CIA will recognize that coordination also implies assistance to the agencies in meeting their responsibilities, including in some cases the temporary assignments of personnel to the agencies.

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State did not mean to convey the concept that coordination always and generally involves financial assistance to the agency being coordinated. What State does infer is that the function of coordination does include assistance of any type to avoid the establishing of functions on the duplicated basis. As a specific example in support of this point of view, Mr. Evans stated that on frequent occasions when assignments are to be accomplished on an ad hoc basis, it may be ascertained that the departmental organization is not adequately staffed or equipped to accomplish the task. Under such circumstances, he contends that the tendency is for us in CIA to conclude that the agency cannot perform the task, and therefore we must set up a section or unit to do so. Such "sections" or "units", according to Mr. Evans, remain as permanent adjuncts of the CIA organization. He reiterated that all such duplications could be avoided if everything that needed to be done on an ad hoc basis, recognizing that it fell within the allocated responsibility of the agency, can be done if CIA will help the agency do so.

II - 1a. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:

That national intelligence applies only to intelligence which is interdepartmental in substance;

Evans does not feel that the present definitions of the NSCIDs need revising. In fact, he emphasizes the view that this recommendation, together with sentence 2 of paragraph 2 of the discussion under "Production of National Intelligence" is merely stating what the directives already propound.

II - 1b. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:

That national intelligence should be developed with a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication of departmental intelligence activities;

Evans does not feel that DCI 3/1 needs revising. He does indicate that we do not live up to it, and that we are always inclined to put production items into the category of "urgent" and "exceptional." I asked him if he did not agree with the statement that CIA may under certain circumstances produce political intelligence and that under 3/1 the Department of State had admitted such. He became a little bit peeved at this question and was somewhat evasive and circuitous in his answer. In a supercilious manner he stated:- To deny that CIA may on occasions do political estimates is too narrow a viewpoint. When they do so, according to Evans, it is a matter of "common interest," which words he used interchangeably with "common concern." He added that

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of course in such cases the political estimates would be prepared by an individual like Mr. Montague. In other words, he assigned this happening to a person rather than to a segment of our organization.

II - 2. That the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the request of a member.

This refers to the members of IAC and not to the agencies. The words "substantial disagreement" mean that when there is an estimate with dissent under present procedures that amounts to a "substantial disagreement" and as such should be discussed. The very fact that the dissent is published makes it, in Mr. Evans' viewpoint, "substantial." He did say that every effort should be made to eradicate the possibility of publishing an estimate with dissent, and he feels that under present procedures this is being done. He holds the view that the publishing of an estimate with dissent is a rather important decision, especially for the dissenting agency, and that the collective discussion at this stage by the IAC members may lessen to a considerable degree the number of dissents. Furthermore, he holds that this is the thinking process of the Dulles report and NSC 50.

III - 1. That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC.

In discussing this recommendation, Evans referred back to what he felt was the meaning of "national intelligence" in the directives; namely that it was distinguished from departmental intelligence "by a substantive overlap between more than one field of departmental interest as allocated." We spent much time discussing the limiting word "only" in line 2 of this recommendation. And again, I asked him the question as to whether State had not already concurred in the viewpoint that we may produce what is definitely a departmental intelligence under certain circumstances. The affirmative reply from Mr. Evans on this question was again very weak, in which he indicated that no one will deny the fact that under certain unusual circumstances CIA "as well as any other agency" may do certain things which are not normally looked upon as within the prerogative of the agency. He elaborated on this viewpoint by stating on rare occasions his office may get a request from the Secretary for something which is almost solely military in content, and that since his office has the necessary information, they work up the answer without referring the request to G-2. At this juncture, I felt like saying that we should no longer receive accusations from State about the fact that ORE was duplicating OIR. But I felt that silence was golden.

"Common concern" means of interest to two or more agencies, and as an illustration of this he mentioned "transportation" and "communications."

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IV - 1. That ICAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly.

Evans said that he did not feel very strong about the daily political summary. In fact he didn't feel too strong about the whole recommendation. However, he felt that the question involved pertained more to the weekly summary than to the daily. I do not believe that anything will be pressed by State on this recommendation.



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